Rebuilding a poverty franchise in MLB The Show 25 demands more than hoping for the best. Virtual general managers face systemic challenges that extend beyond roster construction—ownership interference, weird stadium situations, and the cold, hard reality of baseball economics create dilemmas without easy solutions. Through the lens of 2025 payroll constraints, interesting farm systems, and real-world organizational dysfunction, five franchises stand out as monuments to mismanagement.
I’ve got a few things to nail down before we proceed. First, I imagine this is in GM-only mode, at the hardest levels—meaning we will adhere to each franchise’s “owner” aspects and present restraints. Also, the article will be updated once player ratings are released, so we will go with what we know for certain at last season’s close about each of these doomed franchises.
With San Diego Studio’s overhaul of franchise mode, particularly the new “Front Office Experience,” these rebuilding challenges become even more complex. The new “Motivation” tracker for free agents, dynamic market evolution where top clubs—think Dodgers and Yankees—set the pace, and the increased importance of team reputation, market size, and competitive outlook in player decisions will make these struggling franchises even harder to rebuild. Each team has tricky angles to work through, and that is even more true if you’re a realism fiend like many of us on OS because it means you’ll put “house rules” on yourself to make these real-world issues part of the experience even when the game itself does not.
1. The Something-Something Athletics
The Athletics, with no city designation, will be the most unusual play in the game. John Fisher’s real-life Athletics exist in purgatory—neither here nor there—playing in 14,000-seat Sutter Health Park, a minor league stadium shared with the Sacramento River Cats, while Fisher dreams of Las Vegas glitz. However, the game’s creators have not communicated whether it will exist inside the game. Their $55 million payroll, MLB’s second lowest behind the Marlins, reflects an owner who views baseball as an accounting exercise rather than a competitive sport (at least for now).
Fortunately, the farm system (ranked 11th by Baseball America) and MLB prospects don’t mirror its uninspiring payroll situation. Lawrence Butler’s weird slash (.262/.317/.490) details a lack of walks as an issue, but he’s a talent with plus speed and power. 1B Nick Kurtz and SS Jacob Wilson, two fantastic 2024 top-10 draft picks, are diamonds. But it’s not enough, so rebuilders will depend on more picks, patience in development, and potential international lottery tickets.
30-year-old Brent Rooker is an outstanding DH/corner outfielder on a new team-favorable 5-year, $60 million deal—with the final year at $22 million in 2030, vesting if he hits 900 plate appearances combined in 2028-29. Even after picking up Luis Severino and Gio Urshela, the not-very-talented or deep roster still isn’t meeting the MLB’s revenue-sharing obligations, requiring a minimum payroll of $105 million, which will invite real-life MLBPA grievances.
Under MLB The Show 25‘s new system, where “reputation, market size, and competitive outlook” heavily influence free-agent decisions, the Athletics suffer a dreaded triple handicap. Their nomadic status destroys market appeal, their competitive outlook screams rebuilding, and their reputation for developing players only to trade them away precedes them. SDS’ warning against “overpaying just to get out in front” feels especially relevant here—wannabe Athletics GMs can’t afford bidding wars but also can’t afford to wait too long and miss out entirely.
You must navigate a roughly $50 million spending gap by drafting superior talent, then develop these prospects in subpar facilities. Fisher’s perpetual austerity guarantees that any diamonds you unearth will likely leave for richer pastures, creating a devilish cycle of development and departure. Oh, and the projected age of the Athletics as of now is around 31.4, which would be the 6th oldest in MLB for 2025.
2. Chicago White Sox
Frank Thomas, Robin Ventura, nor Michael Jordan are walking through that door. Here, you’ll embody systematic failure, with their $58 million payroll reflecting a dim situation led by Luis Robert Jr., who’s coming off a down year, to say the least, to front a AAA-caliber roster projected for 120 losses. If there is a bright side, their farm system ranks 4th going by Baseball America’s rankings.
That said, Colson Montgomery’s anemic .214 average in AAA exemplifies the system’s previous under-performance (although he maintains solid prospect status), but Kyle Teel and 2024 1st-round outfielder Braden Montgomery offer some hope (both acquired in the Garrett Crochet deal with the Red Sox). The 2025 draft class likely offers limited respite, though, due to competitive balance restrictions. Guaranteed Rate Field’s hitter-friendly dimensions exacerbate pitching woes (4.67 team ERA in 2024, 28th of 30), and the 28th-ranked attendance starves the budget for necessary improvements.
The game’s new dynamic, where “free agency and trades evolve dynamically, with top teams setting the market,” particularly punishes the White Sox. The new “Motivation” tracker will consistently show free agents with minimal interest in joining a 120-loss team, forcing GMs to overpay dramatically just to enter conversations.
Ownership’s refusal to subsidize player development creates a self-reinforcing cycle of mediocrity—bad players draw smaller crowds, generating less revenue for improvements, resulting in continued lousy play, and so on. With few tradable veterans and minimal free-agent appeal, rebuilders must commit to a long tank-and-develop strategy while praying ownership patience outlasts fan apathy.
You’ll have 19-year-old pitcher Noah Schultz (#16 prospect per MLB.com), who you’ll be itching to call up quickly. This situation will force GMs to walk a tightrope between rushing prospects to the majors and letting them languish in underfunded minor-league facilities. The White Sox represent baseball failure turned art form of creative dysfunction.
3. Colorado Rockies
Your struggle here begins and ends with Coors Field, where sea level has made pitching an act of futility since 1993. As the case every year, their 5.47 team ERA in 2024 directly stems from altitude, which diminishes pitch movement while inflating home run rates. Top prospect Chase Dollander’s 2.59 ERA in A-AA ball (and good spring) indicate he may make the roster in time to throw major-league frisbees. The Rockies picked college player of the year Charlie Condon at No. 3 overall, but he struggled in High-A ball.
The Rockies’ $112 million payroll features Kris Bryant’s $28 million annual whale, locking up funds that could otherwise address bullpen depth. Their adequate farm system (13th ranked), even featuring super-athletic outfielder Benny Montgomery, fails to offset the fundamental pitching problems created by their environment.
MLB The Show 25‘s improved trade logic creates another hurdle for Rockies rebuilders. In previous iterations, AI teams undervalued ground-ball pitchers, letting savvy players exploit the system to acquire sinkerballers for the low. Not so fast, my friend. The new “adjusted signing and trade logic” hopefully means other teams now properly value these pitchers, eliminating a key rebuilding shortcut—brutal for a team already saddled with Bryant’s untradeable deal.
Rebuilders face baseball’s rockiest paradox: develop pitchers in conditions that warp their abilities or trade for established arms at inflated prices while watching homegrown hitters thrive elsewhere. PECOTA projects a real-life franchise-worst 55 wins and 0.0% playoff probability for 2025—and this is partly Denver itself and not entirely reflective of player talent—detailing the mathematical impossibility of building a winner using traditional approaches.
Success demands rethinking player development—prioritizing sinkerballers and defensively gifted outfielders like Gold Glove CF Brenton Doyle while praying Bryant rediscovers his MVP form. Unless you know the trick, the Rockies represent baseball’s unwinnable scenario, where traditional team-building wisdom collapses against environmental realities.
4. Miami Marlins
The Marlins epitomize owner-inflicted suffering with their $47 million payroll sitting well below MLB’s revenue-sharing threshold, inviting union grievances that could strip draft picks and international bonus pools. Owner Bruce Sherman’s refusal to spend leaves the rotation dependent on Max Meyer’s projected 4.30 ERA and a lineup hitting a collective .244.
The organization exists in a cruel NL division, facing three monsters: the always-in-the-mix Braves, the Phillies with their $278 million payroll, and the Mets’ $315 million budget. Miami’s farm system improved (21st overall after a 27th overall ranking the year prior) but lacks genuine star power, with Noble Meyer’s 4.02 ERA between A and A+ ball representing distant hope rather than immediate help. The club has just two Top 100 Prospects, per Baseball America (three if you use MLB’s rankings).
The “Front Office Experience” feature creates a particular challenge for the Marlins. The need to “prioritize how long you spend pursuing a player” forces difficult choices—with minimal budget flexibility, GMs must spread attention across multiple bargain targets while division rivals focus resources on premium talent.
LoanDepot Park sits half-empty most nights (29th in attendance), denying revenue for facility upgrades and creating the atmosphere of extended spring training rather than major league ball. Without payroll increases nor a single player that moves the needle, the Marlins risk perpetual irrelevance in a division where 90 wins might yield a third-place finish.
The way forward includes exploiting Rule 5 drafts and under-slot draft picks to bypass ownership’s austerity while developing trade strategies focused on poaching prospects from division rivals. The Marlins represent the ultimate ownership challenge—can you overcome an owner who values profits over pennants?
5. Washington Nationals
Stephen Strasburg’s $35 million annual, partially deferred salary haunts Washington through 2026 despite his retirement, consuming 30+ percent of their $100 million payroll. (This is on top of the nearly $80 million owed in deferral monies due from 2027 through 2029. Yikes.) This financial anchor limits immediate spending on dependable vets for young studs in Dylan Crews and James Wood, who risk being rushed into stardom.
The Nationals compete in the same brutal NL East as the Marlins, where the Braves and Phillies outspend them by $176 million and $171 million, respectively. Their real MLB roster lacks veteran player traits—remember CJ Abrams’ casino shenanigans—creating gaps for developing prospects. Fortunately, team chemistry and leadership designations aren’t features in this game.
MLB The Show 25‘s “improved realism when it comes to arbitration and salaries” creates a ticking clock for Washington’s rebuild. Suppose prospects like Crews and Wood develop as quickly as you’d hope. In that case, their arbitration values will escalate rapidly under the new system, likely leading to sizable salary jumps right as Strasburg clears the books. Also, SDS has been hating and taking notes. The game’s updated negotiation mechanics mean other teams won’t accept your salary dumps without substantial prospect add-ons, eliminating the tried-and-true strategy for creating flexibility.
Strasburg’s contract limits payroll flexibility until 2027, forcing dependence on low-cost reclamation projects (that get on base or eat innings) and amateur development. Even with a near-perfect prospect situation (the Nationals have the 14th ranked system), the Braves, Mets, and Phillies’ oscillating division dominance likely delays contention until 2029 or after whichever club gets old fastest.
Published: Mar 3, 2025 09:34 am