Question about the Civil War

[st.cronin]

I know there's a few buffs here. My question is:

Did McLellan really believe the intelligence reports inflating the enemy's troop strength?

Whenever I read about him, I always get this feeling that there is no way he could possibly believe that he was outnumbered and still behave the way he did. That he must have known those reports were erroneous, and used them as cover for decisions which were politically motivated, rather than militarily motivated. But I admit I don't really know, and no historian that I've come across ever questions that he may have been duplicitous in this respect.

[SackAttack]

You know, it might also have been kind of going the other way - the spies, in McClellan's service, might have been unwilling to report true numbers. Telling the boss he's wrong is a great way to get fired, after all.

So the guys underneath you tell you what you want to hear, and you believe it because...it's what you want to hear. The stronger the South appeared, the less any given military defeat would be his "fault," either politically or militarily.

[st.cronin]

Well, that's definitely plausible, but that doesn't really solve the problem I'm having, which is that McLellan's tactical decisions occasionally don't make any sense given the intelligence he had, and purportedly believed.

[Karlifornia]

I don't know anything about the civil war, but it's my GOT DAMNED HERITAGE, AND I'LL FLY THE STARS AND BARS FOREVER!!

[Crim]

I don't know anything about the civil war, but it's my GOT DAMNED HERITAGE, AND I'LL FLY THE STARS AND BARS FOREVER!!

That's twice in two days I've chuckled at Karli without a trace of bitterness. What the hell is wrong with me?!?

[Crim]

dola, I'm sleepy, bitterness wasn't what I was reaching for. Contempt? Okay, like, a tablespoon of contempt, folded vigorously into a broth of bemusement, with maybe a dash of irritation to taste.



I think I need a beer. What thread is this?

[SackAttack]

Well, that's definitely plausible, but that doesn't really solve the problem I'm having, which is that McLellan's tactical decisions occasionally don't make any sense given the intelligence he had, and purportedly believed.

You assume he was competent to lead the Army. I'd say, given historical evidence, he was either incompetent or more than a touch paranoid, and the one may have fed the other.

[WSUCougar]

McClellan had a savior complex, believing he was the man to restore the Union, blah blah blah. Yet despite his impressive abilities in honing the Army of the Potomac into an impressive force, I think he was scared to death of losing. He lacked what U.S. Grant called the "moral courage" to move his army aggressively. He saw double the number of Confederates behind every tree, and even when he had things handed to him on a platter (i.e., early on the Peninsula, or - worse - at Antietam), he talked himself out of committing his army fully. Nothing worse than a tentative general.

[Warhammer]

Agreed. He also had full faith in his spies. He and Pinkerton had a pretty good relationship.

Also after the Peninsula campaign he maintained that had McDowall's corps been released to march on Richmond he would have won. So even though he was defeated in a strategic sense, he did not think he had a faulty plan, nor did he look at his own short-comings during the campaign.

[Buccaneer]

I only have a few minutes but, as usual, WSUCoug is right. The answer that I have been trying to find for 20 years was whether McCellan even admitted to the truth in hindsight? Someone trustworthy must have told him in his later years that he only had minimal opponents in front of him going up the Peninsula, so I wondered if he stuck to his belief at the time?

[Peregrine]

Keep in mind too that Mclellan was known for giving his troops everything they needed and supporting them at every turn, and they loved him for it. I think part of the whole ball of wax was that he didn't want to see his men getting butchered.

In terms of hindsight, you should read his letters and memoirs sometimes, he comes across as very arrogant, with his mind set about the way the world works, and anything else, like Lincoln prodding him into action, he views as people trying to meddle with his army.

[JW]

I think WSU Cougar is correct. McClellan actually executed plans very well up until the moment of battle. Antietam is a great example. Acting on the discovery of Lee's plans, he moved aggressively until he confronted The Army of Northern Virginia and Lee. He then acted with excess caution and lost a chance to win the war in one day. Lee otoh acted based on a confidence that McClellan would act cautiously. The night after the battle, he asked Jackson to find a way to attack McClellan's flank despite being outnumbered at that point about 3-1. Finding that it just wasn't possible, he then stood in place an entire day before executing an uncontested retreat across the Potomac.

During the battle if McClellan had simply launched coordinated attacks or used his reserve, which he refused to commit despite pleas from some of his generals, he would probably have crushed Lee's army.

[JPhillips]

McLellan also wanted to find the perfect circumstances for a battle. He couldn't be satisfied with good conditions, he had to wait hoping that the next moment would be more fortuitous than the current moment.

[st.cronin]

Its the peninsula campaign that is exactly what confuses me. I believe the conventional wisdom is something like this: McLellan advanced so slowly, and retreated so quickly, because his intelligence reports listed the enemy strength at 2x what it actually was.

But this doesn't make any sense to me. I think if McLellan really believed he was outnumbered, he would never have advanced at all, he would have immediately withdrawn.

[Mike1409]

spoiler

The North won

/spoiler

[Buccaneer]

Its the peninsula campaign that is exactly what confuses me. I believe the conventional wisdom is something like this: McLellan advanced so slowly, and retreated so quickly, because his intelligence reports listed the enemy strength at 2x what it actually was.

But this doesn't make any sense to me. I think if McLellan really believed he was outnumbered, he would never have advanced at all, he would have immediately withdrawn.

He wanted it both ways. He knew that he wouldn't have to risk battle as long as he and others believed that they were outnumbered but since his enemies (those sitting in the White House) believed otherwise and were pushing for a battle, McClelland could move cautiously protesting all the way (i.e., 'you are making me fight when we are not ready') and had it set up so all blame would fall on the White House, if that makes sense.

[st.cronin]

He wanted it both ways. He knew that he wouldn't have to risk battle as long as he and others believed that they were outnumbered but since his enemies (those sitting in the White House) believed otherwise and were pushing for a battle, McClelland could move cautiously protesting all the way (i.e., 'you are making me fight when we are not ready') and had it set up so all blame would fall on the White House, if that makes sense.

Are you saying he didn't believe he was outnumbered?

[Buccaneer]

Are you saying he didn't believe he was outnumbered?

What I was trying to say was that he made sure got the intelligence results he wanted to justify his reluctaness to force a battle. When you want a desired conclusion, you make sure you got the data to support your conclusion. The Lincoln Administration had different data that showed a much more realistic view of the ANV. McClellan made sure his staff (as well as himself) was convinced that no time was right to fight because he badly needed reinforcements. Since he knew Washington wasn't going to provide him those (because they rightly felt the AP was adequately numbered), he could lay the blame on Washington when he would inevitably fail to take Richmond and/or destroy the ANV. He felt he couldn't lose either way - whether he would luck out on a victory (and get all of the glory he desperately craved) or conversely, any setbacks would be Washington's fault (since he would have rather to lose a battle and blame it on the 'gorilla in the White House' then to risk a major battle where his army would have had to fight). History has shown something funny from all this - McClellan was praised for leading the AP on a successful retreat! That was just like him, huh?

[st.cronin]

Has anybody given a yes or no answer to this question:

Did McLellan believe his intelligence, or not?

[Buccaneer]

Has anybody given a yes or no answer to this question:

Did McLellan believe his intelligence, or not?

History cannot and should be reduced to simple yes or no answers. McClellan made sure got the intelligence results he wanted to justify his reluctantness to force a battle. He believed what he wanted to believe.

[WSUCougar]

Has anybody given a yes or no answer to this question:

Did McLellan believe his intelligence, or not?
When it comes to down to it, I think the answer is "not."

But it's not as simple as that. In that era the concept of "intelligence" in a military sense was sketchy at best. And what Bucc is saying above is that McClellan was able to build up the Confederates as this mighty force that either (a) prevented him from advancing, and/or (b) required heavy reinforcements with which to fight it. So whether he truly believed it or not is largely irrelevant, since he made it into a reality in terms of his operational strategy.

[sabotai]

Has anybody given a yes or no answer to this question:

Did McLellan believe his intelligence, or not?

I think what Bucc is saying is that this question doesn't really reflect what was happening. McClellan, essentially, indirectly created the reports to justify his actions. He didn't get the reports and then believe or not believe them, he already knew what he wanted to do and made sure that the reports would back up his decisions. (At least, that's how I'm reading what he wrote.)

[st.cronin]

So, the most conventional description, then, is wrong, which is: "McLellan advanced down the peninsula so slowly because he believed he was outnumbered." You all seem to agree that that's not a true statement.

[WSUCougar]

I think a better statement would be, "McLellan advanced down the Peninsula so slowly because he was afraid to put his army at risk and therefore encouraged the belief that he was outnumbered."

[JW]

I think the evidence is clear that he thought he was outnumberered in the Peninsula. I'm not sure if he literally believed the intelligence reports, but he apparently gave them a close hearing and they influenced his actions.

McClellan also believed in the strategic offensive but tactical defensive, that is, maneuvering so as to force the enemy to attack you in a favorable position to you. That tended to influence his actions, too.

In the Peninsula campaign he had maneuvered into a position that led the Confederates to believe they had no choice but to attack or abandon Richmond. And they did attack and were repulsed. And had Johnston not been injured, Lee would not have taken command, the turning movement using Jackson may not have happened, and McClellan may well have taken Richmond. He was preparing a general offensive when Lee and Jackson attacked. Lee got inside McClellan's decision cycle in militaryspeak.

[st.cronin]

I think a better statement would be, "McLellan advanced down the Peninsula so slowly because he was afraid to put his army at risk and therefore encouraged the belief that he was outnumbered."

Ok, that's how I interpret it as well.

[st.cronin]

I think the evidence is clear that he thought he was outnumberered in the Peninsula.

What evidence is there for that, other than what McLellan actually said? As I said above, it seems to me that if he actually believed he was outnumbered, he would have evacauted as soon as possible.

[Wolfpack]

That may be, but he wouldn't have kept his job if he did. He was at kind of a put-up-or-shut-up point with Lincoln and it's unlikely he could have retained command if he retreated without a fight.

[JW]

I would say McClellan's conduct of the campaign and his statements are the primary evidence. One either accepts those statements or doesn't. But McClellan also had intelligence indicators that reinforcements had arrived from the West. That was not true, but it certainly didn't help the situation, and McClellan was apparently very much inclined to believe it.

To quote from How the North Won byHattaway and Jones, "Lincoln, again exaggerating what the South could do with its interior lines, was convinced that Lee had received aditional troops from Beauregard."

I think we have a situation where McClellan used the intelligence about being outnumbered for his own purposes and to excuse his actions, but I also think he truly believed he was outnumbered. Most sources do after all agree that with the arrival of Jackson's force that the Confederates probably mustered the largest single force they ever put in the field in the East.

[JPhillips]

I'm not convinced that he believed he was outnumbered, but I do believe that he felt he didn't have the numbers for a decisive attack. He would have wanted to significantly outnumber Lee before attacking and news of reinforcements made it likely that he had little to no superiority in forces.

He was always looking for the situation that guaranteed victory. Whether or not he believed he was outnumbered isn't the point. He certainly did believe that the numbers were closer than ideal, and because of that he was extremely reluctant to commit to battle.

[st.cronin]

My pet theory, which I'm not a trained historian at all, is that McLellan thought a "conquest" by the North would have actually been bad for the country - that all along, he was holding out for a settled peace.

To me, that explains his actions much better than any military considerations.

[Groundhog]

spoiler

The North won

/spoiler

The South will boogie again!

[JPhillips]

I've certainly had that thought, but his dismissal by Lincoln seems to be his turning point politically.

[Buccaneer]

I've certainly had that thought, but his dismissal by Lincoln seems to be his turning point politically.

I don't believe so, I think he had been from a family of prominent Democrats and he supported Stephen A. Douglas. His actions as a general certainly was clouded by opposition politics since the beginning of the war.

[JPhillips]

But do you really see him as an advocate of a settled peace while he was a general? I guess that's what I mean. I think he became a proponent of a settled peace because it was so obvious that if he couldn't win, there was no possibility of victory.

Seeing him as consciously throwing away the lives of his soldiers because of political motives seems way out of character.